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BILLS OF LADING AS COLLATERAL SECURITY.
The use of credit has increased with the growth in population and. the development of business. It has been estimated
that about eighty-five per cent of the business transacted in the
'United States is effected by means of credit instruments., It
has been stated that the use of credit "furnishes a more perfect
and convenient means of payment in large sums and between
distant places .than the precious metals, saving time and labor.
Credit takes the place of corresponding amounts of gold and
silver. This is a saving, as it enables us to employ these precious
metals for other useful purposes. Capital is employed," as a
result of the use of credit, "more productively. He who possesses
capital but for any reason is unable to make use of it, transfers
it to another for a compensation to the benefit of both as well as;
that of the public economy." '2 As the ute of credit is based essentially upon the confidence of the creditor in the debtor, of
the creditor's faith in the debtor's ability to pay an obligation
when it matures, the absence of credit knowledge seriously impairs the extension of credit in both domestic and foreign trade.
This restraint upon business has been met by the use of some
form of collateral to secure the payment of the specific debt
when it is due. In the movement of goods, the shipping documents are the most c6mmonly used as collateral when attached
to a draft drawn by the seller of the goods upon the buyer.
They consist of the bills of lading, issued by the carrier of thez
goods, the insurance policies, commercial or consular invoices,
and other miscellaneous certificates. Of these the bill of lading
is of prime importance because it is a token of title to thegoods, and a receipt showing that the goods have been actually"
received by the carrier for transportation.3 The interest which
Findings of Dr. David Kinley, as a result of an investigation conducted for the National Monetary Commission in 1910. Phillip's Read-.
ings In Banking, pg. 150; Credits and Collections, Ettinger and Golieb,.
pg. 6.
2
Findings of Professor Conrad, quoted by Professor Ely, "GermanCo-operative Credit Unions."
3
Banking and Business, Willis and Edwards, p. 268. Bills of LadIng may be taken in the name of the consignee; to the order of the consignee; or to the order of -theconsignor. When taken "straight" in thename of the consignee it is practically worthless as collateral security;

to the order of the consignee it is valuable as security if offered by the
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must determine the banker's rights, remedies, and liabilities
upon discounting a draft with a bill of lading attached has
given rise to much confusion and conflict of opinion among the
courts throughout the many jurisdictions.
It seems that much of the conflict of opinion and diversity
of the holdings of the many courts upon practically the same
facts exist as a direct consequence of the many interpretations
that have been given to general broad statements as to the legal
character of bills of lading, and their significance as documents
of title. The interpretation of the words title and property is
open to so many different results that this alone'is sufficient to
cause such confusion. To some the word title is a mere relative
term, expressing relative rights that may exist in several persons
at the same time to the same goods; while to others the term is
absolute in its nature, incapable of division and can only exist
in the general owner, the trustee or the mortgagee of the property.4
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has been inclined to say
that the interest which a bank receives upon discounting a draft
with a bill of lading attached is that of a pledgee. Its holding
is based upon the theory that the transfer of the bill of lading
is equivalent to the transfer of the possession of the goods, and
consignee.

The bill of lading taken to the order of the consignor is

the correct form and the most valuable as collateral. Bills of Lading
as Collateral Security under the Federal Law. 16 Michigan Law Revicw, 402, 409. When the bill of lading is taken "straight" in the name
of the consignee the carrier does not have to demand the bill of lading
before delivering the goods. Wigton. v. Bowley, 130 Mass. 252. The
pledgee of a bill of lading made to the order of the consignor can recover against the carrier who forwards goods upon the order of the
pledgor without receiving the bill of lading; the pledgee cannot recover
against the carrier if 'the goods were shipped under a bill of lading in
the name of the consignee. Forbes v. Boston & Lowell Railway Co.,
133 Mass. 154.
one writer very aptly stated the difficulty when he observed that
"the use of the artificial concept 'property' in the law of sales of goods,
has inevitably produced some difficulties. Whether the policy of oneworded brevity in describing complex and varying groups of phenomena
should prevail despite the resulting vagueness, is as a practical matter
no longer arguable, for the Sales Act adopts the term and requires one
categorically to decide who has the 'property' as a basis of determining
certain legal consequences." The same writer defines "property" as a
"description of the conclusion drawn from the presence of certain attributes," and enumerates those attributes as "the risk of loss," the
"right to specific goods," "the right to possession until some act, e. g.
payment is performed," and "the power of disposal." The Passing of
Property as Affected by a Bill of Lading to the Seller's Order. 22
Columbia Law Review, 462.
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for that reason the transaction more nearly resembles the creation of a pledge than the execution of a mortgage. In the case
of Douglas, Receiver, etc. v. People's Bank of Kentucky, 5 the
court said: "It is also well settled that the owner of a bill of
lading may pledge the same as collateral security for a debt;
and as it is indispensible to the validity of a pledge that the
actual possession of the. property pledged should pass to the
pledgee, so the possession of the property which is sought to be
pledged while it is in transit may be effected by transferring the
bill of lading. Such transfer of the bill is regarded as the equivalent to investing the pledgee with actual possession of the
property. Such pledge does not invest the pledgee with title to
the property. The title remains in the pledgor; but the pledgee
acquires a lien upon the property for the security of his debt,
and this lien as long as he retains the possession of the property, either actual or symbolical, is a legal lien which is paramount to, and will therefore prevail against any prior equities
existing on behalf of third parties of which the pledgee had no
notice or of which he was not required by law to take notice.*6
The facts of the case are very unsatisfactory, however, to sustain
such a sweeping statement. It was an action brought by a bank
to recover from a railroad company for the wrongful delivery
of goods which were subject to a bill of lading pledged to the
bank. The evidence as to whether the bank had surrendered the
bill of lading to the consignee was contradictory and conflicting
in its nature, and the court seemed to have flnally rested its decision upon the basis that the bank was estopped by its past
conduct in permitting the consignee to secure the possession of
the property by a surrender of the bill of lading, to assert that
title was in the bank and that the delivery by the carrier was
wrongful. The case cannot be cited, therefore, as conclusive authority for the proposition that the negotiation of the draft with
the bill of lading created a pledge which became ineffectual upon
86 Ky. 176, 5 S. W. 420, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 243, 9 Am. St. Rep. 276,
cited with approval by Scottsville Oil Co. et al v. Dye Bros. et al. 203
Ky. 496, 262 S. W. 615.
The court -there cited Petit v. FirstNational Bank of Memphis, 4
Bush (Ky.) 334, which holds that a bank discounting a draft drawn on
the vendee of cotton with a bill of lading taken in the name of the
vendee has a superior lien to attaching creditors of the shipper. Ken
tucky Refining Go. v. Bank of Morrilton, 89 S. W. (Ky.) 492, which was
cited with approval by Grooms v. N ational-Bank of Kentucky et al.,
218 Ky. 846, 292 S. W. 512 accord.
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the surrender of the constructive possession. Indeed there is
authority which states that the interest of the bank is that of a
mortgagee. In re Non-Magnetic Watch Go.7 decided that where
a seller ships goods under a contract of sale, by the terms.of
which title does not vest in the buyer until accepted by him, and
takes a bill of lading for the goods so shipped, which he transfers.
to a bank to secure payment of a draft for the price of the goods
drawn on the consignee -by the seller, and discounted for him by
the bank, "the bank acquires legal title to the goods which it is
entitled to hold until payment of its claim." It is thus seen that
the definitions propounded by the courts shed very little light
upon the rights and liabilities of the bank arising from itsnegotiation of a draft with a bill of lading attached.
Upon examining some of the legal consequences of taking
the bill of lading in the name of the shipper we find that it reserves the "property" in the goods to the shipper, which is subject to a levy under an execution by a judgment creditor. In
the appellant
Kentucky Refining Co. v. Globe Refining C
bought oil from a vendor in Texas. By the terms of the sale the
quantity and the quality were guaranteed and the vendor failed
to perform according to the terms of the guaranty. The appellant brought an action for the breach of the contract and recovered. Upon obtaining judgment an attachment issued and the
oil, which had been shipped in the appellant's cars, was levied
upon by the sheriff. The appellee intervened and made claim
to the same oil. Its claim was based upon a second contract of
sale by the vendor after the appellant had refused to accept a
draft for the purchase price. The subsequent contract with the
N. Y. St. Rep. 98, 34 N. Y. S. 1017, Banks and Banking, 2 Michle,
Section 179, p. 1550.
8104 Ky. 559, 47 S. W. 602, 84 Am. St. Rep. 468, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 779,

42 L. R. A. 353, 22 Columbia Law Review, 462, at p. 465 cited with

approval by Frick & Lindsey Co. v. Holbrook,et az., 202 Ky. 416, 259 S.
W. 1033, which held, that when goods are shipped under a bill of lading taken in the name of the shipper and forwarded with draft attached under a contract of sale, the contract is finally executed upon
the passage of title at the place of delivery to the buyer, and therefore
-the latter county had jurisdiction of the case rather than the county
where the goods were delivered to the carrier; and by Bruno, et al v.
Phillips& Co., 80 Ind. Ap. 658, 142 N. E. 21, which stated that the legal
effect of taking the bill of lading in -the name of the seller and indorsing it to a bank with draft attached was to reserve title in the bank
and that "where there Was no evidence to rebut the effect and the presumption arising from the bill there is no question to submit to a jury.
The legal presumption must and does control."
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appellee was completed and it accepted a sight draft by telephone the same day as the levy of the attachment by the sheriff.
Attached to the draft, accepted) by the appellee, was a bill of
lading taken in the name of the seller. It was indorsed as follows, "On payment of attached draft, deliver to the Globe Refining Co.-" The court held that the property was subject to
the attachment of the appellant. By taking the bill of lading
to the order of the shipper the title, the ju-s disponendi of the
goods was reserved to the consignor and the appellant could
attach the same. The mere acceptance of the sight draft was
not sufficient to pass title to the appellee for by the very terms
of the indorsement of the bill of lading it was not to be delivered until payment of the draft.
Another consequence of that "property" reserved -in the
vendor by taking the bill of lading to his order is the "right of
disposal." In the case of Proctor& Gamble Ca. v. Peters, White
& Co.,9 the vendor delivered oil to the vendee's cars, and took
the bill of lading to his own order, and to the notice of the
vendee. The vendee's name was stricken therefrom and that of
another party inserted. The first buyer brought an action for
conversion. The court held that he could not recover. A seller
who takes a bill of lading in his own name not only retains the
right to the possession, but also the property in the goods and
has complete control over them, and the second buyer acquires
an indefeasible right under a subsequent contract of sale.
Though the goods here were delivered to the buyer's receptacles,
the fact that the seller took the bill of lading to his own order
overcame the presumption of an intention to appropriate the
goods to the contract.
The property thus reserved seems to be distinctly a security
title, and like that of a conditional sale10 if the goods are destroyed or deteriorate in value the loss must fall upon the buyer.
This was the rule in New York even before the adoption of the
Uniform Sales Act. The rule there seems to have arisen from a
dictum in rarmer's etc. Bank v. Logan" which did not even
involve the loss of goods. The question there presented was
whether the bank could maintain its rights to the goods against
9 233 N. Y. 77, 7 Cornell Law Quarterly 399.

1Pratherv. Norfelt, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 178, XV Kentucky Law
Journal, 155.
%174N. Y. 568.
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a bona fide purchaser who bought the same without notice of the
bank's title. The dictum, however, recited: "Had it lessened
in value, or been burned up, he," the buyer, "would have been
liable to the plaintiff," the bank, "first, on his promises to accept the draft, and after acceptance, on that obligation to pay
it." The New York court affirmed this as the common law rule
in the case of Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co.
Inc.12 Here the vendor in California failed to perform his contract by the terms of which the shipment was to be made under
a bill of lading to the shipper's order. TAe question involved
was as to the measure of damages, whether the contract was to
be considered as having been breached in California or New
York. The court held that the breach should be considered as
having occurred at the place where the property passed. This
they said was California, and this was true even though that
state had not adopted the Uniform Sales Law. Cardoza J. said,
"We axe not advised that the Uniform Sales Law has been
adopted in that state. We think, however, that the statute in
the provisions above quoted is declaratory of the rule at the
common law." He there cited Professor Williston.13 From
what has been stated above it might be readily seen that the
Uniform Sales Law prevailing in many jurisdictions, has provided that the buyer is to bear the risk of loss when goods are
shipped under a bill of lading to the shipper's order.' 4 The
dietum announced in Farmer's etc. Bank v. Logan, Supra, had
been previously stated as the law in England. In the case of
Brown v. Hare15 rape oil was shipped under a bill of lading to
the shipper's order, and under a contract which provided that
it should be shipped "free on board, point of delivery." The
ship was lost at sea. The brokers of the vendor presented a
draft with documents for acceptance after they had received information that the goods had been destroyed. When the vendees
learned of the loss they returned the documents and insisted that
they should not bear the loss of the goods. In an action for failure to accept the bill of exchange, and for goods sold and deN. Y. 413, 135 N. E. 834.
Williston on Sales, Section 284, 34 Harvard Law Review, 751.
Uniform Sales Act, Section 22 (a), has not been adopted by Kentucky. The Federal Uniform Bill of Lading Act applies to all of the
states in interstate commerce. 1 Minnesota Law Review, 493.
3 H. & N. 484, affirmed 4 H. & N. 822.
12233

141
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livered, the court held that they were liable, that the loss should
fall upon the vendee.
There have been cases, however, which failed to distinguish
the true nature of the title reserved by the vendor and upon
finding that the bill of lading was taken in the name of the shipper, declared that it was the purpose of the vendor to reserve
the title to the goods until payment. They imposed as an incident
of this title the risk of loss or deterioration of the goods while in
transit. In Cragun Bros. v. Todd & Kraft 8 a buyer of peaches
in Des Moines, Iowa, refused to accept the same upon their arrival. The contract of sale provided that they should be delivered "free on board at Hot Springs, Utah." The car was delayed and the shipment was in a damaged condition upon its
arrival. In an action for the contract price the court held that
the vendor could not recover. Some have been of the opinion
that this was the rule of the common law and that the liability
of the vendor was changed by the Uniform Sales Act. 17
Notwithstanding the rule that the bank acquires18 "the
right of disposal" reserved by the vendor by taking the bill of
lading to his own order, and is relieved from the burden of the
"risk of loss," which passes to the purchaser, it does not
assume the liabilities of the transferor under the contract of
sale for the performance or fulfillment of its warranties of quality. Although this question was early passed upon, it was only
recently presented to the Kentucky Court in the case of
Hawkins v. Atfalfa Products Co.19 The vendee of a carload of
meal purchased the same from a Nebraska Corporation, and accepted and paid a draft drawn by the vendor to which was attached an order bill of lading in the name of the vendor and to
the notice of the vendee. The draft had been discounted by the
defendant bank. The meal proved of inferior quality and of
little value. The vendee attempted to attach the money paid by
him to the bank in satisfaction of his damages for the breach of
contract of sale. The court held that the bank had the superior
131 Iowa 250, 108 N. W. 450.
Cases, 16 Illinois Law Review, 545.
'The transfer of a bill of lading by indorsement and delivery for
value, passes to the transferee whatever title the transferor had at
the time. Dickson v. Merchant's Rlevator Co., 44 Mo. App. 498.
"152 Ky. 152, 153 S. W. 201, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 600, quoted with
approval In Munson v. De Tamble Motors Co., 88 Conn. 415, 91 Atl. 531,
L. R. A., 1915A, 881.
10

21Comment on Recent
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right to the money thus paid and the vendee could not recover.
It said: "To impose upon the transferee of a bill of lading who
takes it in good faith for a valuable consideration, the duty of
fulfilling the contract between the seller and the buyer would
impair if not, destroy the value of bills of lading as instruments
of trade and commerce, in the transaction of which they play so
useful a part. No bank would feel safe in advancing or lending
money on a bill of lading if the law burdened it with the performance of the contract between the seller and the buyer."
The New York court was likewise very late in passing upon the
liability of a bank upon discounting a draft with a bill of lading
attached for a breach of the contract of sale. It did so in the
case of Springs.et al v. Hanover National Bank.2 0 In that action
the bills of lading were forged and the vendee did not discover
the forgery until the draft had been paid. Like the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, the New York court held that the vendee
could not recover back money paid to the bank in satisfaction
of the draft, and established its rule in accord with that of the
majority of the courts.
North Carolina, Texas and Alabama at first followed a rule
to the contrary, which permitted the vendee to recover for the
breach of contract of warranties, both in an action upon the acceptance of the draft and in an action by the drawee to recover
back money paid thereon. In Fincb v. Gregg et al.21 the drawee
bought "good corn" and had accepted and paid a draft presented by the bank with bill of lading attached. A second shipment was made under a similar arrangement and the buyer
began attachment proceedings to recover for the loss which he
had sustained by reason of the first shipment which proved of
inferior quality. The court hetd that the bank as assignee of
the bill of lading, taken in the name of the shipper, became the
owner of the property and succeeded to the rights and liabilities of the vendor. They were therefore liable upon the warranty of quality contained in the contract of sale. It followed
Lando v. Lattin Bros.2 2 which held the bank liable in an action
by the vendee for a breach of warranty of quality of wheat.
- 209 N. Y. 224, 103 N. E. 156, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 241.
"126 N. C. 176, 49 L. R. A. 679.
= 19 Tex. Civ. App. 246, 46 S. W. 48, overruled by the Texas Supreme
Court when the question was certified by the court of Civil Appeals in
Blaidsell,Jr.Co. v. Citizen National Ba k, 96 Tex. 626, 75 S. W. 292. On
motion for rehearing the Court of Civil Appeals adopted the answer
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Mason et al v. Nelson et al.2 3 overruled Finc. v. Gregg,
supra, the majority opinion being written by the judge who presided in the Superior Court upon the trial of that case. The
plaintiff in this action bought cotton by sample, accepted and
paid a draft which had been discounted by a bank in Texas.
The cotton proved of inferior quality and the buyer brought his
action to recover back money paid to the bank under a mistake
of fact. The court held that a demurrer to the petition should
be sustained.

The court adopted the criticisms 24 of Finc& v.

Gregg, made at the time that opinion was written. The dissenting opinion stressed the hardship that was worked upon the
vendee who had no opportunity to inspect the goods before payment of the draft 25 and who was denied, by this rule, the right
to recover back money paid to the bank. It also objected that
the manufacturing interests of North Carolina were fast growing, and that local consignees were obtaining goods from all
sections of the country and that this rule would seriously impair
the security of trade and the development of commerce.
The Alabama Court in J. C. Hass, et al. v. Citizens' Bank of
of the Supreme Court and sustained a demurrer to the petition in an
action to recover back money paid to the bank. 76 S. W. 70.
148 N: C. 492, 62 S. D. 625.
The Annotator in 49 L. R. A. 679 at p. 683 considers that Finch v.
Gregg, and Landa v. Lattin Bros. were decided upon wrong principles
and if the right principles had been considered a different result would
have been reached. The view was criticized, first: Because of the
measure of damages that could be received against the vendor for
breach of warranty of quality would ordinarily be the difference between
the value of the goods if they had been as warranted, and their actual
value in their defective condition. Under special circumstances, such
as sharp fluctuations in the market price, the buyer might thus recover
from the seller almost double the price of the goods as determined by
the original contract. It would be manifestly unjust to hold the bank,
who was not a party to the original warranty, in excess of the amount
actually received by it. A second criticism was founded upon the idea
of the negotiability of the draft attached to the bill of lading. If the
bills of exchange are negotiable in form, and the bank is an innocent
holder for value, the drawee cannot set up the defective quality of the
goods as a failure of consideration, nor that the bill of lading was fictitious. The leading case of the ample authority cited was Robinson v.
Reynolds, 2 Q. B. 196.
2 A dictum in Old National Bank of Traupaca v. People's Bank of
Harrisville,89 W. Va. 132, 108 S. D. 716, 18 A. L. R. 728, stated that the
consignee might inspect the goods under an order from the bank and
-the carrier could not demand the bill of lading. But see Ten Broeck
Tyre Co. v. Rubber Trading Co., 136 Ky. 526, 217 S. W. 345.
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Dyersburg26 was the third jurisdiction to adopt what seems to,
have been the minority view as to the bank's liability upon the
contract of the vendor upon discounting his draft with a bill of
lading attached. The plaintiff in this action purchased bran and
meal and accepted and paid a draft presented by the defendant
bank without an opportunity to inspect the cars. Upon an inspection there appeared to be a shortage. They brought their
action against the bank and the court held that the demurrer
to the petition should be overruled. It treated the transaction
as an assignment of the contract of sale, between the original
parties, to the bank. The court stated that the title remained
in the vendor by terms of the bill of lading, and upon the negotiation of the draft the bank became the purchaser of the goods.
They refused to accept the doctrine that the bill of lading wastaken for security only, that the real transaction was in the
nature of a loan to the vendor by the bank, or that the bank
was the vendor's agent for collection. The court refused to apply
the rule in the case of Bank of Guntersville v. Jones Cotton
C0.27 The vendor of cotton in that action, pursuant to the instructions of the purchasers, consigned the same to a Cotton
Company, and attached to the bill of lading a draft drawn upon
the Cotton Company to the order of the vendor. The bank
cashed the draft and the Cotton Company having accepted the
same could not defend an action thereon because of the failure
of title in the vendor. The case is distinguished on the ground
that there was no retention of title in the vendor.
One of the strongest arguments for supporting the view of
the Kentucky court in saying that the interest received by the
bank is that of a pledgee rather than that of a mortgagee and a
reason that has undoubtedly influenced the courts in avoiding
any definite description of that interest is that most jurisdictions do not require the documents to be registered under the
2' 144 Ala. 562, 39 So. 129, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 242, was practicallyoverruled by Cosmos cotton Co. v. First National Bank of Birmingham,
171 Ala. 392, 54 So. 621, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1173, though the opinion
attempted to distinguish -the Hass Case. It held that a bank discounting a draft with bill of lading attached was not liable in an action
brought by the consignee for shortage or inferiority of quality in the
shipment. Three of the Justices concurred in -the opinion; two in the,
conclusion, but thought the Hass Case contra and should be overruled;
and one thought the Hass Case unsound but properly differentiated and
it was unnecessary to overrule it.
156 Ala. 525, 46 So. 971.
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filing statutes. 28 The holding that it is a mortgage however, is
not open to criticism provided the transferee retains the documents of title. In fact this objection has been met by the statement that the interest of the bank is that of a mortgagee in possession. In Seward v. Miller & Higdon,2 9 the consignee of fruit
was the shipper's agent. He sold the fruit while it was in transit and drew a draft upon the vendee for the price. This he discounted at the bank. The vendee refused payment and the consignee resold the fruit. Before it was paid for by the second purchaser, the fruit was attached as the property of the consignee.
The court held that the bank might prevail. The opinion stated
that, "The indorsement and delivery of a bill of lading to a
bank as collateral security for paper discounted, not only invests
the bank with title to the goods, but operates as a delivery of
the goods, and the bank in such case, if not the absolute owner,
stands in the position of a mortgagee in possession, and is not
required, in order to protect its lien to have its papers recorded." It cited First National Bank v. KeZley.30
This result seems both logical and desirable but it is not a
complete solution of the problems since in importing goods and
raw materials upon credit, it is often necessary for the bank to
surrender the documents of title to the buyer for the purpose
of resale or processing the same. This is necessary for in many
instances it is out of the profits of the specific transaction that
the buyer expects to meet his acceptance due at the bank. The
bank in this situation usually attempts to protect its interest by
a trust receipt. In the proper situation the trust receipt has
been sustained. One of the earliest cases and the one most frequently cited as authority for this proposition is Farmers &
Mechanic Bank v. Logan, supra. The court there permitted the
bank to prevail over a purchaser from the principal. The documents of title had been surrendered to the principal for a
specific purpose and notice of authority thus given was stamped
upon the bill of lading. The court denied that the bank was
the mere pledgor and that it lost its special property upon surrender of the goods. It said the bank was the general owner and
that the purchaser from the principal could not rely upon the
possession alone but was required to inquire into his title and
Kentucky Statutes, Section 496.
106 Va. 309, 55 S. E. 681.
$057 N. Y. 34.
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right to dispose of the goods. There are other transactions
where the attempt to use the trust receipt has proved unsuccessful. The newly developed method of financing the distribution
in the automobile industry by separate Finance Corporations is
an example.3 1 The attempt of the Finance Corporations to reserve the title and at the same time surrender the possession to
the Sales Agencies has been treated by the courts as the usual
chattel mortgage. The reason for this holding is that by the
transaction the titles to the automobiles pass directly to the distributors and their subsequent recital that it is vested in the
Finance Corporation is ineffectual against the creditors of the
distributors.
It seems that the better description of the trust receipt
transaction, the one that is sustained by the courts, is that it is
in the nature of a chattel mortgage. And this is true even
though the courts have not-required that the trust receipt should
be recorded. The principal reasons that the courts have exempted the recording of trust receipts are the utter impracticability of making the banks conform to this practice; and
also, the ever present tendency to encourage any legitimate
means of increasing the business activity in the community. A
most learned analysis and discussion of the problem 32 has distinguished the trust receipt from the usual chattel mortgage in
that prior to the time of the arrangement, the obligor has had
neither the possession nor the title to the goods. For this
reason it has not fallen within the evils sought to be eliminated
by the recording acts. Here the seller of the goods has formerly
had both the possession and the title to the goods. By the sale
and discounting the draft with the bill of lading attached he
passes a security title to the bank which is equivalent to that
of the ordinary mortgagee; and also passes to the buyer the
equity of redemption. New difficulties have been raised by the
Uniform Sales Act since it seems certain that an innocent
holder for value would prevail over the holder of the trust receipt. It has been suggested, however, that the banker might
protect his interest by stamping or wifting on the documents
33
the 'urpose for which they were surrendered.
31Annotation 49 A. L. R. 282, at p. 309.

, The Trust Receipt as Security. 22 Columbia Law Review 395
and 546.

'*2 Williston on Sales, Section. 437, citing Dows v. National Exchange Bank, 91 U. S. 618.
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Since taking the bill of lading to the order of the shipper
reserves the "property" in the goods which is subject to a levy
under an execution; and since it reserves to the shipper the
power of disposal, it is evident that two important elements,
two important incidents of the ownership of goods are thus reserved to the shipper and transferred to the bank. The idea
that that ownership is absolute, however, is refuted by the rule
that the risk of loss and deterioration pass to the buyer. It is
further refuted by the rule that a transferee of the bill of
lading does not warrant the quality nor the quantity of the
goods under the original contract between the buyer and the
seller. It thus appears that the bank receives title to the goods
upon negotiation of a draft with a bill of lading attached, but
that title is only for security. It is that of a mortgagee. This
description is objectionable in that the bank is not required to
record its papers under the filing statutes. This has been
answered by the rather artificial explanation that the bank
stands in the position of a mortgagee in possession. Others
frankly explain it upon, the practical necessities of trade, and
stress the impracticability of requiring the banks to record their
paper, and the benefits received by the community as a result
of the stimulus afforded to business. Under the trust receipt relation it seems that one is forced to abandon the analogy of a
mortgagee in possession, for in that situation the bank has surrendered the possession to the buyer. This situation also proves
to be an aeid test for the description of the bank's property as
that of a pledgee. Here, clearly, the rights of the bank would
be lost if the interest received by it were of no greater value
than the mere right to the possession of the goods until payment. It is therefore submitted that it is more accurate to describe the property of the bank as that of a mortgagee, whose
title is not subject to the filing statutes, since in this situation
the evil of misleading creditors by the separation of the ownership and possession of the goods does not exist.
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